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ABSTRACT 
Today’s launch vehicles complex electronic and avionics 
systems heavily utilize Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA) integrated circuits (IC) for their superb speed and 
reconfiguration capabilities. Consequently, FPGAs are 
prevalent ICs in communication protocols such as MIL-
STD-1553B and in control signal commands such as in 
solenoid valve actuations.  
This paper will identify reliability concerns and high level 
guidelines to estimate FPGA total failure rates in a launch 
vehicle application. The paper will discuss hardware, 
hardware description language, and radiation induced 
failures. The hardware contribution of the approach 
accounts for physical failures of the IC. The hardware 
description language portion will discuss the high level 
FPGA programming languages and software/code 
reliability growth. The radiation portion will discuss 
FPGA susceptibility to space environment radiation.  
INTRODUCTION 
The digital integrated circuit that makes up the FPGA is 
based on Complementary Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor 
(CMOS) technology.  This integrated circuit is designed 
to be configured by the end user or customer after 
manufacturing. Unlike Application Specific Integrated 
Circuit (ASIC), FPGAs are designed with the capability 
to be configured and reconfigured, hence the name 
“Field programmable”.  As shown in Figure 1, the 
internals of the FPGA IC consists of programmable logic 
blocks and a hierarchy of reconfigurable interconnects 
that can be inter-wired in different configurations. Those 
interconnects are made possible through the CMOS-
based IC transistors.  The user gets to program the 
hardware of the FPGA by programing the logic structure 
of the device: logic blocks and interconnects.  
In complex electronics, such as those used in the 
spacecraft, FPGAs are generally used to perform 
command, control and communication signal functions. 
The FPGA is used as the interfacing device between the 
controlling/commanding device (e.g., flight computer) 
and the commanded component, such as solenoid valves 
controlling flow from fuel tanks or thrust vector 
controllers.  
 
Figure 1. SRAM-Based FPGA Logic Blocks and 
Interconnects [1] 
Herein lies the ability of FPGAs to introduce catastrophic 
failures for launch vehicles, such as loss of mission, 
vehicle, or loss of crew. FPGA hardware has the potential 
to experience different failure modes, such as fail-in-place 
or fail high/low. Likewise, Hardware Description 
Language (HDL) coding errors and radiation induced 
failures have the potential to drive the FPGA to initiate 
erroneous actuation of the FPGA-controlled components.   
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1. GUIDELINES TO ESTIMATE FPGA 
FAILURE RATE 
The approach described below aims to provide guidelines 
to consistently estimate FPGA failure rates across generic 
spacecraft subsystems. The discussion of this approach 
will be divided into three sections, hardware, hardware 
description language code, and radiation effects.  
It is important to note that Bayesian updates apply to all 
three risk contributors discussed in this paper to 
incorporate data that becomes available from testing and 
flight operations. 
1.1 Hardware Contributions 
The bathtub curve, shown in Figure 2, characterizes the 
hazard function and comprises three parts, infant 
mortality, useful life, and wear out. The “Infant mortality” 
steep slope of the curve represents initially high failure 
rates that decrease with time as defective parts are 
identified and discarded. The curve then flattens as the 
failure rate becomes more constant and the curve is 
referred to as constant failure rate region or useful life 
region. Eventually, the failure rate increases in the wear 
out region as age and wear induce failures,     
In the Useful Life region, the time between random 
failures, is a reliability figure of merit known as Mean 
Time Between Failures (MTBF), MTBF is  the inverse of 
the component’s failure rate (𝜆 =
1
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹
).   
Hardware failure rate data sources for an FPGA include 
historical data, similar component/model demonstrated 
reliability data, testing, prediction as in MIL-HDBK-
217FN2, or expert elicitation.   
 
Figure 2. Bathtub Curve Hazard Function for Hardware 
Failure Characterization 
1.2 Hardware Description Language 
Contributions 
The goal of this Section is to provide guidelines to 
account for failures arising from programming languages 
used to program FPGAs.   
 
The logic blocks and interconnects of an FPGA are 
considered hardware, and are programmed/synthesized 
by programming software such as Very High Speed 
Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language 
(VHDL) or Verilog where the code is subject to software 
“failure” causes such as bad requirements, programming 
errors (coding bugs), latent errors, etc. According to 
NASA Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) 
report by Johnson Space Center, latent error is defined as 
“A segment of code that fulfills its requirements except 
under certain off-nominal, and probably unanticipated 
conditions” [2]. Latent errors make it past testing and 
onto operational flights before they are discovered.   
It is necessary in this Section to make a distinction 
between hardware and the software used to program the 
hardware in terms of failure rate/reliability. This is due 
to the fact that software and hardware are dissimilar in 
many aspects. The PASS report [2] points out that 
software does not wear out over time as hardware does. 
Software is not susceptible to fatigue or to 
environmental stressors such as temperature, pressure, 
shock, vibration and radiation. Therefore, the software 
hazard function cannot be characterized by the bathtub 
curve, but is rather modeled with the software reliability 
curve, as shown in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. Software Reliability Curve 
The Test/Debug region of the curve represents discovery 
and correction of code faults prior to or during 
operational use. In the Useful Life region, upgrades 
introduce new code faults and are evident by the spikes 
in failure rates. However, the maturity of the code (early 
mature, mid-mature, and late mature [2]) during Useful 
Life must be factored in estimating the code’s 
probability of failure. Late-matured code is expected to 
be the most robust of the three maturity levels. Software 
risk assessment is often considered relatively more 
difficult than hardware risk assessments, and every 
spaceflight program with an interest in quantifying 
FPGA HDL risks would need to leverage historical data, 
test data, and prediction data when possible. Finally, in 
the Obsolescence region, no more upgrades to the code 
are conducted and the failure rate in this region becomes 
entirely driven by latent errors. 
1.3 Space Radiation and FPGAs 
Space environment is characterized by different sources 
of radiation that exist within the various space 
environments (e.g., South Atlantic Anomaly, or Van 
Allen Belt).  Ionizing radiation, has the potential to strip 
off electrons from the molecules they interact with, hence 
the name “ionizing radiation”. Listed below are the most 
common types of radiation found in space [3]. 
I. Galactic Cosmic Radiation (Cosmic Rays) 
This type of high energy ionizing radiation comes from 
exploding stars (Supernovae), and has strong potential to 
strip-off electrons or leave ionic tracks in the insulation 
layer of the gates, and is considered the most damaging. 
It is very difficult to shield spacecraft components from 
this type of radiation.  
II. Trapped Radiation 
Trapped radiation is comprised of highly energetic 
charged particles trapped in the Earth’s magnetic field, 
also known as the Van Allen Belt. The threat associated 
with this type of radiation is eliminated once the space 
vehicle is travelling outside of the Van Allen Belt.    
III. Solar Energetic Particles 
The source of these particles is the sun and they appear in 
high intensity. Protection from these high-energy particles 
is easier than cosmic rays and trapped radiation. 
1.3.1 FPGA Hardware and Space Radiation 
As mentioned above, ionizing radiation deposits energy 
onto the molecules or atoms it interacts with, and is 
capable of stripping off their electrons. These high energy 
particles can interact with the CMOS semiconductor 
doping of the FPGA, causing erroneous FPGA operation, 
which poses a threat to the spacecraft reliability.   
In general, ionizing radiation effects on integrated 
circuits such as the FPGA, are classified into two 
categories: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Single Event 
Effects (SEE). TID is defined as the radiation 
accumulation thresholds before a transistor starts to 
experience variation in voltage thresholds and its 
junctions start to leak currents, leading to functional 
failure of the transistor. The significant sources of 
radiation in this case varies from trapped electrons, 
trapped protons, and solar protons.  Fortunately, TIDs do 
not pose a threat to modern spacecraft as their FPGAs 
may come equipped with radiation hardened 
technologies that can withstand long years of radiation 
accumulation.  
On the other hand, SEEs are a serious concern to 
spacecraft and must be accounted for in the fault tree 
analysis. They are capable of interrupting a data path 
and/or causing loss of key spacecraft control function 
(e.g., loss of communication with flight computers, loss 
of propulsion control or erroneous valve actuation) 
leading to loss of mission/crew.  A SEE occurs when an 
energetic particle, such as a cosmic ray’s heavy ion or a 
heavy proton in the Van Allen belt strikes the FPGA 
integrated circuit leading to disruptive effects. SEE 
comprises two main categories: soft SEEs and hard 
SEEs. A soft SEE is referred to as Single Event Upset 
(SEU), and includes data upsets like bit flips to memory 
cells or transient pulses in the logic circuitry.  Hard SEEs 
are Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFI) and Single 
Event Latch-up. (SEL). SEL is considered the most 
severe case of SEE that leads to physical destruction of 
the IC.  Fortunately, modern designs and technologies of 
the spacecraft FPGAs have rendered SELs unlikely to 
occur.     
1.3.2 FPGA Programming Technology and Space 
Radiation 
Space-flight FPGAs come in different 
memory/programming technologies such as flash-based, 
Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) based or 
antifuse-based.  Flash-based FPGAs and SRAM cells are 
more vulnerable to TID and SEU, respectively. A 
penetrating cosmic ray heavy ion has the capability, 
depending on the material density and shielding 
thickness, to penetrate and change logic gates voltage 
thresholds which can lead to changes in the logic 
structure.  However, antifuse based FPGAs are not 
reprogrammable and are significantly less sensitive to 
data upsets or damaged by heavy ions at the energy 
levels found in space [4].   
Some modern spacecraft technologies are inclined 
toward lowering costs by reducing requirements for 
components physical parameters such as weight, size, 
and power consumption, without compromising 
performance. In order to accomplish this objective, ICs 
like SRAM utilize new technologies including high 
speed and lower power CMOS and fiber optics, which 
are very vulnerable to SEEs [5].    
1.4 Failure Rates and the Fault Tree 
Table 1 below provides the most common data sources to 
each failure category of the FPGA along with examples to 
illustrate the expected format of the failure rate or 
probability of failure (Pf). A typical spacecraft FPGA 
high level fault tree should conform to the fault tree shown 
in Figure 4, which illustrates FPGA high level fault tree 
logic.  
 Figure 4. FPGA Fault Tree High Level Logic (OR) 
 
Table 1. Data Sources and Example Failure Rates 
 
2. Conclusion 
FPGAs speed, configuration flexibility, and cost 
effectiveness have made the ICs highly sought after in 
space mission programs to implement high-speed signal 
processing in spacecraft. However, the FPGAs reliability 
have been rendered vulnerable to three failure categories: 
physical hardware, programming-induced failures, and 
radiation-induced failures. FPGA hardware is an 
integrated circuit of components with proven reliability 
track record such as transistors and multiplexors, 
therefore, it is safe to assume that FPGAs hardware 
reliability estimates are more reliable than the hardware 
programming languages and radiation effects by a 
significant margin. Programming of the hardware logic 
blocks and interconnects are susceptible to failures 
introduced to the code including wrong requirements, 
coding errors, and latent errors. Radiation effects pose a 
substantial threat to the reliability of the FPGAs and are 
the predominant risk contributor to FPGA failures [5] in 
space environment. The ionizing radiation of the space 
environment interact with the CMOS technology of the 
semiconductors of the FPGAs. Depending on the energy 
level of these radiations, the effects could slowly 
accumulate over the years until a functional failure occurs 
(TID), or the functional failure could be instant (SEE). In 
general, an FPGA fault tree should conform to Figure 4 
and account for the three failure categories as independent 
failures (OR logic).  
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Failure
Category
Data Sources Notes Arbitrary Example 
Failure Rate/Pf
Hardware Historical data, 
prediction 
methods, and 
demonstrated 
reliability data 
from reliability 
databases such as 
EPRD
Modern technology 
and robust 
manufacturing 
techniques have 
renderred  the 
hardware risk 
category to be of 
low-impact, relative 
to the other two 
failure categories
1.45 FPMH (68,965 
MTBF)
*FPMH = Failure per 
Mill ion Hour
VHDL Historical data, 
demonstared data 
and software 
prediction 
programs data
Software reliability 
growth should be 
factored in (early 
mature, mid-mature, 
and late mature). 
Failure rate/failure 
probability is 
expected to 
progressively 
improve with each 
growth category. The 
fault tree should 
account for the most 
current growth 
category only
Pf per KSLOC:
Early-Mature 7E-06 
Mid-Mature   4E-06 
Late-Mature  1E-06 
*Pf = Probability of 
Failure
* kSLOC = 1,000 SLOC
Radiation Historical data, 
demonstared data 
and SEE prediction 
programs such as 
CREME96 
The predominant 
contributor to the 
SEE prediction is the 
soft and transient 
errors (SEU)
500 FPMH (2,000 
MTBF)
